Denial of Services Based Countermeasures Key Exchange Protocols

Abstract

Cryptography has become indispensable in areas such as e-commerce, the legal safeguarding of medical records, and secures electronic communication. Cryptographic protocols like key exchange usually require expensive computations such as finite field exponentiations or elliptic curve scalar-point multiplications. In an adversarial environment such as the Internet, an attacker could effect a denial of service attack against a server by forcing the server to perform many instances of a cryptographic protocol. To help tackle this challenge, several cryptographic primitives and constructions have been proposed, including mechanisms to securely distribute data over a unidirectional insecure channel, schemes in which leakage of cryptographic keys can be traced back to the leaker, and techniques to combine revocation and tracing capabilities. In this paper we proposed the integration of denial of service countermeasures key exchange protocol by introducing a formal model for denial of service resilience that complements model for secure key agreement, we cover a wide range of existing denial of service attacks and prevent them by carefully using client queries and puzzles.